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ABSTRACT
As the GAN-based face image and video generation techniques,
widely known as DeepFakes, have become more and more ma-
tured and realistic, the need for an effective DeepFakes detector
has become imperative. Motivated by the fact that remote visual
photoplethysmography (PPG) is made possible by monitoring the
minuscule periodic changes of skin color due to blood pumping
through the face, we conjecture that normal heartbeat rhythms
found in the real face videos will be diminished or even disrupted
entirely in a DeepFake video, making it a powerful indicator for de-
tecting DeepFakes. In this work, we show that our conjecture holds
true and the proposed method indeed can very effectively expose
DeepFakes by monitoring the heartbeat rhythms, which is termed
as DeepRhythm. DeepRhythm utilizes dual-spatial-temporal atten-
tion to adapt to dynamically changing face and fake types. Extensive
experiments on FaceForensics++ and DFDC-preview datasets have
demonstrated not only the effectiveness of our proposed method,
but also how it can generalize over different datasets with vari-
ous DeepFakes generation techniques and multifarious challenging
degradations.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Human and societal aspects of se-
curity and privacy; • Information systems→Multimedia in-
formation systems; • Computing methodologies→ Artificial
intelligence.
KEYWORDS
DeepFake detection, heartbeat rhythm, remote photoplethysmog-
raphy (PPG), dual-spatial-temporal attention, face forensics
1 INTRODUCTION
Over the years, multimedia contents such as image and video have
become more and more prevalent on various social media platforms.
More recently, with the advancement in deep learning based image
and video generation techniques based on a line of work called the
∗Both authors contributed equally to this research.
†Qing Guo is the corresponding author (qing.guo@ntu.edu.sg).
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Figure 1: An example of a real video and its fake video that can be generated
by various manipulations, e.g., DeepFakes, Face2Face, FaceSwap, and Neural-
Textures [50]. Clearly, it is hard to decide which one is real or fake through
the appearance from a single frame. Actually, the state-of-the-art DeepFake
detection method based on Xception [9] fails in this case. However, we find
that the manipulations easily diminish the sequential signals representing
remote heartbeat rhythms.
generative adversarial networks (GAN) [21], anyone can now gen-
erate e.g., a realistic looking face that does not exist in the world, or
perform a face swap in a video with high level of realism. The latter
is what the community refers to as the DeepFake [32–34]. Such a
face swap used to require domain expertise such as theatrical visual
effects (VFX) and/or high speed tracking with markers (e.g., motion
captures in the movie Avatar). But now, any one can do it with
ease. The low barriers to entry and wide accessibility of pre-trained
DeepFake generator models are what the problem is. DeepFakes are
now a tangible threat to the integrity of multimedia information
available to us. DeepFakes when applied on politicians, fueled with
targeted misinformation, can really sway people’s opinions and can
lead to detrimental outcomes such as manipulated and interfered
election without people even knowing about it.
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Therefore, the fight against DeepFakes is in dire need now. Al-
though the detection of DeepFakes is a fairly new research frontier,
there has been some attempts to spot DeepFake videos. Some meth-
ods are based on traditional digital forensics techniques as will be
discussed in Section 2.2, while others rely heavily on deep learning
based image and video classification (real vs. fake) from the raw
pixel-domain DeepFake inputs. However, such detection methods
based solely on the raw pixel-domain input might become less effec-
tive when the DeepFake images and videos become more and more
realistic as the deep image generation methods themselves become
more mature in the near future. Consequently, a fundamentally
different DeepFake detection method is needed.
In this work, we present DeepRhythm, a novel DeepFake detec-
tion technique that is intuitively motivated and is designed from
ground up with first principles in mind. Motivated by the fact that
remote visual photoplethysmography (PPG) [62] is made possible
by monitoring the minuscule periodic changes of skin color due
to blood pumping through the face from a video, we conjecture
that normal heartbeat rhythms found in the real face videos will be
diminished or even disrupted entirely in a DeepFake video, making
it a powerful indicator for detecting DeepFakes. As shown in Figure
1, existing manipulations, e.g., DeepFakes, significantly change the
sequential signals of the real video, which contains the primary
information of the heartbeat rhythm.
To further make our proposed DeepRhythm method work more
robustly under various degradations, we have devised and incorpo-
rated both a heart rhythm motion amplification module as well as
learnable spatial-temporal attention mechanism at various stages
of the network model.
Together, through extensive experiments, we have shown that
our conjecture holds true and the proposed method indeed can
very effectively expose DeepFakes by monitoring the heartbeat
rhythms. More specifically, we have outperformed four state-of-
the-art DeepFake detection methods including Bayer’s method
[3], Inception ResNet V1 [52], Xception [9] and MesoNet [1] in
the FaceForensics++ benchmark [50] and show high robustness to
JPEG compression, noise, and blur degradations. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the very first attempt to expose DeepFakes using
heart beat rhythms. Our main contributions are:
• We propose DeepRhythm the very first method to realize
effective DeepFake detection with the heart beat rhythms.
• To highlight the sequential signals of face videos, we pro-
pose the motion-magnified spatial-temporal representation
(MMSTR) which provides powerful discriminative features
for high accurate DeepFake detection.
• To fully utilize the MMSTR, we propose the dual-spatial-
temporal attention network to adapt dynamic changing faces
and various fake types. Experimental results on FaceForen-
sics++ and DeepFake Detection Challenge-preview dataset
show that our method not only outperform state-of-the-art
methods but is robust to various degradations.
2 RELATEDWORK
2.1 DeepFakes Generation
In recent years, DeepFake techniques have gained widespread atten-
tion and been used in generating pornographic videos, fake news,
and hoaxes, etc. Some early studies use face-wrap-based methods to
generate fake videos. For example, Bregler et al. [4] tracks the move-
ment of the speaker’s mouth and morph the input video. Dale et al.
[11] present a video face replacement-based method through a face
3D model. Similarly, Garrido et al. [17] propose a face warp system
while keeping the original face performance. Later, they propose a
new photo-realistically replacement based on high-quality monocu-
lar capture [18]. Thies et al. develop a real-time expression transfer
for facial reenactment [54] and propose the Face2Face method [55]
that tracks target and source facial expressions to build a face 3D
model and re-renders source face on the target model. Then, Thies
et al. [53] further uses neural textures and deferred neural render
to generate the forgeries.
Besides above face-wrap-based methods, more and more Deep-
Fake approaches, i.e., PGGAN [32], StyleGAN [33] and StyleGAN2
[34], employ the generative adversarial network (GAN) [21] to re-
alize the near-realistic face synthesis. Moreover, some GAN-based
methods can alter face attributes, e.g., changing or removing the
color of the hair, adding glasses or scars [8, 20, 26, 56], and modify-
ing persons’ facial expression [37]. Overall, GANs have shown its
astonishing potential in this area and are easy to use and popular
with the public. However, current DeepFake methods, even those
based on GANs, do not explicitly preserve the pulse signal, inspir-
ing us to complement the pulse signal to distinguish the real and
manipulated videos.
2.2 Forgery and DeepFake Detection
DeepFake detection is challenging since GAN-based DeepFakes can
generate near-realistic faces that are hardly detected even using
the state-of-the-art digital forensics. To alleviate this challenge,
researchers are exploring effective solutions to identify fake videos.
Early attempts in this field focus on detecting forgeries. Pan et
al. [46] detect image splicing by estimating local noise variances.
Buchana et al. [5] apply shallow methods such as correlation filters
to spot the forgery. Fridrich et al. [16] assemble many diverse sub-
models to build steganography detectors. And Goljan et al. [19] use
3D co-occurrences to improve the accuracy of steganography de-
tectors. However, these hand-crafted models can be strenuous since
the SOTA DeepFake methods can generate more and more realistic
faces (e.g., FaceApp, Reflect, and ZAO). Then, researchers regards
the DeepFake detection as a classification problem by extracting
discriminative features, e.g., color cues [39], monitoring neuron be-
haviors [58], and employing classifiers, e.g., support vector machine
(SVM), to tell whether a video is fake or real.
Besides above early attempts, many research teams use SOTA
deep neural network (DNN) architectures to detect forgery images.
Cozzolino et al. [10] apply a DNN model on calculating residual-
based local features and achieve significant performance. Bayar et
al. [3] propose a novel network architecture to detect traces left
on editing images. Rahmouni et al. [49] also design a pooling layer
to build a DNN for distinguishing manipulated images. Zhou et
al. [63] combine a CNN-based face classification stream with a
steganalysis-based triplet stream, yielding good performance. As
more forged video datasets being presented and gained competitive
results, researchers are trying to apply much more complex and
advanced network architectures on video forgery detection, such as
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Inception-ResNet [52], MesoNet [1], and Xception [9]. And Nguyen
et al. [40] attempt to use capsule networks on fake detection, also
getting great performance.
In addition to above convolutional neural networks (CNNs),
some researchers use recurrent neural network (RNN) combined
with the CNN to extract image and temporal features to distinguish
real and fake videos. For example, Güera et al. [24] use CNN fea-
tures to train a RNN to classify videos. Similarly, Sabir et al. [51]
use a sequence of spatio-temporal faces, as RNN’s input to classify
the videos. Further more, Dong et al. [12] utilize an attention mech-
anism to generate and improve the feature maps, which highlight
the informative regions.
Being different from existing methods, our method initiates the
first step of using remote heartbeat rhythms for DeepFake detection.
To achieve high detection accuracy, we propose a motion-magnified
representation for the heartbeat rhythms and employ an spatial-
temporal representation to improve the ability of distinguishing
real and fake videos.
2.3 Remote Photoplethysmography (rPPG)
Anti-Spoofing
Face spoof detection is a similar task with DeepFake detection and
aims to determine whether an input video contains a live face or a
face photo or mask. As the remote heart rhythm (HR) measuring
techniques achieving great developments [2, 6, 31, 35, 47, 48, 62],
many researchers use rPPG to detect face spoofing attacks. For
example, Li et al. [36] use the difference of pulse between real faces
and printed faces to defend spoofing attacks. Nowara et al. [42]
compare PPG signals of facial and background regions to decide
whether the face is live or not. Heusch et al. [28] use the long-term
statistical spectral (LTSS) on the pulse signals, and Hernandez-
Ortega et al. [27] employ the near infrared (NIR) against realistic
artifacts. Moreover, combining with deep learning methods, Liu
et al. [38] extract spatial and temporal auxiliary information, e.g.,
depth map and rPPG signal, and feed them to a neural network to
distinguish whether it is a live face or spoofing face.
Overall, existing anti-spoofingmethods also benefit from employ-
ing rPPG for liveness detection, which seems similar to our work.
However, there are foundation differences: the liveness detection
mainly relies on the judgment about whether the heart rhythms ex-
ist or not; our work aims to find the different patterns between real
and fake heart rhythms since fake videos may still have the heart
rhythms but their patterns are diminished by DeepFake methods
and is different from the real ones, as shown in Fig. 1.
3 METHOD
We propose the DeepRhythm (Sec. 3.1) to realize effective Deep-
Fake detection by judging if the normal heartbeat rhythms in face
videos are diminished. Figure 2 (a) shows the whole pipeline of the
proposed DeepFake detector.
3.1 DeepRhythm for DeepFake Detection
Given a face videoV = {Ii }Ti=1 that contains T frames, our goal is
to predict if this video is real or fake according to the heart rhythm
signals. To this end, we first develop the motion-magnified spatial-
temporal representation (MMSTR) (Sec. 3.2) for face videos, which can
highlight the heart rhythm signals and output a motion-magnified
spatial-temporal map (MMST map), i.e.,X = mmstr(V) ∈ ℜT×N×C
whereT is the number of frames, N is the N region of interest (ROI)
blocks of the face in V (i.e., the regions marked by the blur grid
in Figure 2 (a)), and C means the number of color channels. In
the following , we formulate with single color channel for clear
representation but use RGB channels in practice. Intuitively, X
contains the motion-magnified temporal variation of N blocks in
the face video, i.e., highlighted heart rhythm signals.
We can simply design a deep neural network that takes the
MMST map as input and predict if the raw video is real. However,
various interference, e.g., head moving, illumination variation, and
sensor noises, may corrupt the MMST map. As a result, the contri-
butions of different positions in the MMST map are not always the
same (e.g., the three patches shown in Figure 2 (a) have different
heart rhythm strength), which definitely affects the fake detection
accuracy. To alleviate this challenge, we should assign different
weights to different positions of the MMST map before further
performing the fake detection
y = ϕ(A ⊙ X), (1)
where ϕ(·) is a CNN for real/fake classification, ⊙ denotes the
element-wise production, and y is the prediction result (i.e., 1 for
fake and 0 for real). The matrix A ∈ ℜT×N provides different
weights to different positions of X and is known as an attention
mechanism. In our implementation, we use RGB channels that share
the attention matrix.
We propose to generate A from deep networks. However, due
to the diverse types of fake and dynamic changing faces, it is diffi-
cult to generate proper A for different real/fake face directly. We
handle this problem by further decomposing A into two parts, i.e.,
spatial attention s ∈ ℜN×1 and temporal attention t ∈ ℜT×1. We
reformulate Eq. (1) as
y = ϕ((t · s⊤) ⊙ X), (2)
Intuitively, the two attentions indicate when (along the T ’s axis)
and where (along the N ’s axis) of the inputted MMST map should
be used for better fake detection. Furthermore, the number of pa-
rameters of s and t, i.e., N + T , is much smaller than the one of
A, i.e., N ·T , which lets the spatial-temporal-attention is easier to
tune.
Then, the key problem is how to generate t and s to adapt
dynamic changing faces and various fake types. In Sec. 3.3, we
propose the dual-spatial-temporal attention network to realize
Eq. (2) by jointly considering prior & adaptive spatial attention
and frame & block temporal attention.
3.2 Motion-Magnified Spatial-Temporal
Representation
A straightforward way of employing heart rate (HR) signals for
DeepFake detection is to use existing HR representations that are
designed for the remote HR estimation. For example, we can use
the spatial-temporal representation (STR) proposed by Niu et al.
[41] for representing HR signals and feed them to a classifier for
DeepFake detection. However, it is hard to achieve high fake detec-
tion accuracy with the STR directly since the differences between
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Figure 2: Pipeline of our DeepRhythm, i.e., (a), and its two main modules: motion-magnified spatial-temporal representation (MMSTR), i.e., (b), and dual-spatial-
temporal attentional network (Dual-ST AttenNet), i.e., (c). We also show the main differences of MMSTRs between real and fake videos in sub-figure (b).
real and fake videos are not highlighted, i.e., STR’s discriminative
power for DeepFake detection is limited.
To alleviate the problem, we propose the motion-magnified STR
(MMSTR) where differences between real and fake face videos can
be effectively represented. Specifically, given in a face video, i.e.,V
having T frames, we calculate MMSTR using the following steps:
(i) Calculate landmarks1 of the faces on all frames of V and
remove the eyes and background according to the landmarks,
e.g., the faces shown in the left of Figure 2 (b).
(ii) Perform the motion magnification algorithm [43, 61]2 on the
background removed face video and obtainmotion-magnified
face video with RGB space.
(iii) Divide the face areas of all frames into N non-overlapping
ROI blocks, i.e., regions marked by the blue grid in Fig-
ure 2 (b), and perform average pooling on each block and
each color channel for each frame. We then obtain the MMST
map, i.e., X, as the sub-figures shown in the right of Fig-
ure 2 (b). Each row of X represents the motion-magnified
temporal variation of one block on RGB channels, as the red,
green, and blue curves shown in Figure 2 (b).
Figure 2 (b) shows examples of real and fake face videos and their
MMST maps, respectively. We have the following observations: 1)
it is difficult to judge which video is fake by just seeing the raw
1We use the dlib for landmark detection: https://github.com/codeniko/shape_
predictor_81_face_landmarks.
2We use its python implementation: https://github.com/flyingzhao/PyEVM.
frames. 2) differences between the real and fake videos can be easily
found on our MMST maps that will provide effective information
for fake detection. The advantages of MMSTR over STR will be
further discussed in the experimental section.
3.3 Dual-Spatial-Temporal Attentional
Network
In this section, we detail the dual-spatial-temporal attentional net-
work (Dual-ST AttenNet) with which we can realize accurate Deep-
Fake detection through the MMST map and its spatial and temporal
attentions, i.e., t and s defined in Eq. (2).
3.3.1 Dual-Spatial Attention. We propose the dual-spatial atten-
tion
s = sa + sp, (3)
where sp ∈ ℜN×1 and sa ∈ ℜN×1 are the prior and face-adaptive
spatial attentions, respectively. The prior attention sp is a fixed
vector whose six specified elements are set as one while others are
zero. Such attention is equivalent to consider the HR signals from six
specified ROI blocks and ignore signals from other blocks. The six
specified ROI blocks are the four blocks under eyes and two blocks
between eyes, as shown in the Figure 2 (c). The intuition behind this
idea is that the specified blocks are usually robust to various real-
world interference while the HR signals of other blocks are easily
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Visual Heartbeat Rhythms
, ,
diminished when unexpected situations happen, e.g., head moving
might let the HR signals of blocks at face boundary disappear.
In addition to the prior spatial attention, we also need a face-
adaptive attention, i.e., sa, to highlight different blocks according
to the environment variations adaptively since even the same face
under different situations, e.g., the illumination changing, may have
different effective ROI blocks. To this end, we propose to train a
spatial attention network to generate the adaptive spatial attention,
which contains a convolution layer that has 64 kernels with size
being 15 × 1 followed by a batch normalization layer and max
pooling layer. The CNN’s parameters are jointly learned with the
whole framework.
3.3.2 Dual-Temporal Attention. DeepFake methods usually add dif-
ferent fakes (i.e., different fake textures at different face locations)
to different frames, which not only destroy the smooth temporal
variation of a face but lead to inconsistent fake magnitude among
frames (i.e., some frames contain obvious fake textures while oth-
ers have few or no fakes). We propose dual-temporal attention to
consider above information
t = tb + tf , (4)
where tb ∈ ℜT×1 and tf ∈ ℜT×1 indicate which frames are more
significant for final fake detection. Specifically, we train a LSTM to
represent the temporal variation of a face, which is sequentially fed
with each row of the MMST map, i.e., X, and outputs tb that is de-
noted as the block-level temporal attention. The LSTM’s parameters
are jointly trained with the whole framework.
To take full advantage of fake textures in each frame, we train
a temporal-attention network that takes each motion-magnified
frame as input and scores how fake of the frame independently
and get tf . The frames with higher probability to be fake contribute
more to the final classification and we denote tf as the frame-level
temporal attention. In practice, we use the Meso-4 architecture
[1] as the network containing a sequence of four convolution lay-
ers and two fully-connected layers. The Meso-4’s parameters are
independently trained for the frame-level fake detection.
3.3.3 Implementation details. Our dual-spatial-temporal attentional
network is shown in Figure 2 (c) where a MMST map, i.e., X, is first
employed to produce the adaptive spatial attention, i.e., sa and the
block-level temporal attention, i.e., tb, through a spatial attention
network and a LSTM, respectively. The pre-trained Meso-4 is fed
with the motion-magnified face video and outputs the frame-level
temporal attention, i.e., tf . Finally, the attentional MMST map, i.e.,
(t · s⊤) ·X, is fed to the ϕ(·) for the final DeepFake detection where
we use ResNet18 [25] for the ϕ(·).
We jointly train parameters of the spatial attention network,
the LSTM, and the ResNet18 use the cross entropy loss with Adam
optimizer. The learning rate and weight decay are set as 0.1 and 0.01
respectively. The max epoch number is set to 500, and training will
stop if validation loss did not decrease in 50 epochs. For training the
Meso-4, we use the same hyper-parameters. We use videos from
FaceForensics++ [50] as the training dataset which is introduced in
Sec. 4.1 and Table 1. Our implementation and results are obtained
on a server with Intel Xeon E5-1650-v4 CPU and NVIDIA GP102L.
4 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we perform a comprehensive experimental analysis
cover the following aspects: baseline comparison on DeepFake
detection accuracy & robustness and ablation study on DeepFake
detection accuracy & robustness.
4.1 Dataset and Experiment Setting
Dataset. We choose FaceForensics++ [50] as our training and
testing datasets, and use DeepFake Detection Challenge preview
(DFDC-preview) [15] as an additional testing dataset to evaluate
our method’s cross-dataset generalization ability.
FaceForensics++ dataset consists of thousands of videos manipu-
lated with different DeepFake methods and contains four fake sub-
datasets, i.e., DeepFake Detection (DFD), DeepFake (DF), Face2Face
(F2F), and FaceSwap (FS). However, the original FaceForensics++
dataset has the data imbalance problem. For example, the original
DFD subset contains 2728 fake videos, but only has 268 real videos.
To solve this problem, we make the following improvements: 1)
we augment the real videos from actor and YouTube by flipping
them horizontally and get total 2510 real videos. 2) To evaluate
our method on whole FaceForensics++ dataset, we build an extra
dataset, i.e. ‘ALL’ in Table 1, by concatenating the four subsets and
augment the real videos by flipping them horizontally and vertically,
and rotating them 180 degrees. We details the final four subsets,
the ALL dataset, and their partitions about training, validation, and
testing in Table 1. The dataset partition ratio is 8:1:1 and we remove
the augmented videos in the testing datasets.
For videos in DeepFake Detection Challenge, we directly use
it as testing set. The details can be find in Table 1. Directly using
DFDC-preview dataset as testing set will cause imbalance between
number of real and fake videos. So we randomly choose 500 videos
from real part and 500 videos from fake part and assemble them
as testing set, then test every method formerly trained on ALL’s
training set on it to compare their performance.
Pre-processing. For every video in the testing and training
datasets, we take the first 300 frames to produce the MMST map.
Specifically, while processing frames, we first use MTCNN [45] to
locate face region then use Dlib to get 81 facial landmarks [44]. If a
frame cannot be found any facial area, this frame will be abandoned,
and if more than 50 frames were abandoned, this video will not be
used to train network.If more than one faces were detected in one
frame, the one closer to the faces detected from previous frames
will be reminded.
Baseline.We choose state-of-the-art DeepFake detection meth-
ods, i.e., Bayer’s method [3], Inception ResNet V1 [52], Xception
[9] and MesoNet [1], as baselines. All of them have excellent perfor-
mance on FaceForensics++’s benchmark [13] 3. For Bayer’s method
[3], we do not find publicly available code, so we re-implement
it via Keras. For Inception ResNet V1 [52] and Xception [9], we
directly use Keras provided code and only add a Dense layer with 1
neuron after the final layer to get prediction. As for MesoNet [1],
we directly use the code provided by authors [14].
It should be noted that these baselines perform the fake detection
on an image instead of a video, i.e., estimating if a frame is real or
3We chose top-4 accessible methods as baseline, all of them get great performance on
FaceForensics++ benchmark
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Figure 3: Three real-fake video pairs, their MMST maps and the colorful difference maps between real and fake. The state-of-the-art methods, e.g., Xception
and MesoNet, cannot recognize the fake videos while our method successfully separates the fake videos from real ones since the heartbeat rhythm patterns are
diminished by various fakes.
fake. We make the following modifications to make them suitable
to address videos: 1) For the testing setup, we use these baselines
to predict every frame of the video and count the number of real or
fake frames. If the real frames are more than fake ones, we identified
this video as real, and vice versa. 2) In terms of the training setup,
we take the first five frames for every training video in the ‘All’
dataset in Table 1 and extract their facial region via MTCNN, all
these faces are divided into training, validation, and testing subsets.
We also employ Adam optimizer with batch-size of 32 and learning
rate to be 0.001. The max epoch number is 500, and training will
stop if validation loss did not decrease in 50 epochs.
4.2 Baseline Comparison on Accuracy
We test our method and baselines on five datasets (DFD, DF, F2F,
FS, ALL) and the DFDC-preview with the models trained on FF++’s
four sub-datasets and the ALL dataset, respectively. The results can
be found in Table 2.
Results on FaceForensics++. In general, on Table 2, we ob-
serve that our DeepRhythm achieves the highest accuracy on all
datasets among the baseline methods. First, our method always
has better results than other methods, regardless of which training
dataset we use. This demonstrates the generalization of our method
across various DeepFake techniques. Second, although we adopt the
MesoNet in our framework for the frame-level temporal attention,
our method significantly outperforms the MesoNet on all cases,
e.g., when trained on ALL dataset, DeepRhythm gets 0.96 on the FS
while MesoNet only has 0.719, which validates the effectiveness of
our MMST representation and other attention information, and also
indicates the potential capability of our framework for enhancing
existing frame-level DeepFake Detection methods. Third, although
the baseline method Xception has obtained significantly high accu-
racy, e.g., 0.985 and 0.995 on the testing dataset of F2F and FS, it is
still worse than our method, which demonstrates that our method
outperforms the state-of-the-art methods.
We show three cases from the FaceForensics++ dataset in Figure 3
where all baseline methods fail to recognize the fake videos while
our method successes. The fake techniques diminish the sequential
signal patterns of real videos (e.g., the wave of the real video in
the first case becomes flat in the fake video), which are effectively
captured by our MMST maps.
Real Video Fake Video
Diff. Real 
& Fake
s : Adapt. 
a
spatial att.
MMST map of Real Video
MMST map of Fake Video
Diff. MMST map of & Real Fake 
t : Block-level temporal attention
b
Figure 4: An example of a real video, the corresponding fake video, the dif-
ference image between real and fake frames (Diff. Real & Fake), the MMST
maps of real and fake videos, the differencemap between real and fakeMMST
maps (Diff. MMST map of Real & Fake), the adaptive spatial attention (sa, i.e.,
adapt. spatial att.), and the block-level temporal attention (tb).
Results on DFDC-preview. According to results on DFDC in
Table 2, like the result on ALL’s testing set, Bayer’s still performs
worse than others, getting 0.5 accuracy. Inception ResNet V1 per-
forms a little worse than their performance on ALL’s testing set,
getting 0.597. Xception performs worse than its performance on
ALL’s testing set, only gets 0.612 on DFDC-preview. Same as our
method, gets 0.641, only a little better than Xception, but still is the
second highest accuracy. Although MesoNet performs not as good
as it on ALL’s testing set, it gets the highest accuracy, getting 0.745.
4.3 Ablation Study on Accuracy
To demonstrate the effectiveness of our motion-magnified spatial-
temporal representation (MMSTR), dual-spatial-temporal attention
network, and end-to-end training, we exploit an ablation study by
first training the basic model with existing spatial-temporal (ST)
map at the start and then add our contributions one by one.
DeepRhythm variants.We first train the bare model (DR-st),
which only use ST map as its input without motion magnification
and attentions. Then, we use MMST map as inputs and re-train our
model (denoted as DR-mmst), still not using any attentions. After
that, base on the pre-trained DR-mmst, we add adaptive spatial
attention (A) and block-level temporal attention (B), respectively,
(i.e., DR-mmst-A and DR-mmst-B) and go on fine-tuning. After
DeepRhythm: Exposing DeepFakes with Attentional
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Table 1: Details of FaceForensics++ (FF++) and DFDC-preview datasets for both testing and training
Dataset original total real fake training set validation set testing set
FF++
DFD actor+youtube 5238 2510 2728 4190 524 524
DF youtube 1959 988 971 1567 195 197
F2F youtube 1966 988 978 1572 196 198
FS youtube 1971 988 983 1582 197 198
ALL actor+youtube 10680 5020 5660 8544 1068 1068
DFDC-preview - 3310 578 2732 - - 1000
Table 2: Comparison with baseline methods on FaceForensics++ and DFDC-preview datasets with the models trained on sub-datasets and ALL dataset of Face-
Forensics++, respectively. We highlight the best and second best results with red and yellow.
train on sub-datasets train on ALL dataset
test on DFD DF F2F FS DFD DF F2F FS ALL DFDC
Bayer and Stamm [3] 0.52 0.503 0.505 0.505 0.501 0.52 0.503 0.505 0.5 0.5
Inception ResNet V1 [52] 0.794 0.783 0.788 0.778 0.919 0.638 0.566 0.462 0.774 0.597
Xception [9] 0.98 0.995 0.985 0.98 0.965 0.984 0.984 0.97 0.978 0.612
MesoNet [1] 0.804 0.979 0.985 0.995 0.958 0.822 0.813 0.783 0.909 0.745
DeepRhythm (ours) 0.987 1.0 0.995 1.0 0.975 0.997 0.989 0.978 0.98 0.641
50 epoches validation loss did not decrease, the models stop train-
ing, we add prior spatial attention (P) and frame-level temporal
attention (F) on DR-mmst-A and DR-mmst-B, respectively, then
get DR-mmst-AP and DR-mmst-BF which are further fine-tuned.
Followed, based on either DR-mmst-AP or DR-mmst-BF, we use
four attentions together (i.e., DR-mmst-APBF) and carry on training.
Finally, we compare this progressive model (i.e., DR-mmst-APBF)
with our final version (i.e., DR-mmst-APBF-e2e) where the adap-
tive spatial attention (A), block-level temporal attention (B), and the
classification network are jointly or end-to-end trained.
In the whole process, we train and test each model on same train-
ing and testing data with the same hyper-parameters, as introduced
in Sec. 3.3.3. The result can be found in Table 3.
Effectiveness of MMSTR. As shown in Table 3, our MMSTR
significantly improves the DR-st’s accuracy, e.g., 0.328 improve-
ment on ALL dataset. Actually, the ST map from [41] almost has no
discriminative power for DeepFake detection since DR-st gets accu-
racy around 0.5 on every testing datasets, which means it randomly
guessing a video is real or fake. After using our MMSTR, DR-mmst
achieves average 0.217 accuracy increment over DFD, DF, F2F, FS,
and ALL datasets.
Effectiveness of single attention. Based on the DR-mmst, we
add the adaptive spatial attention (DR-mmst-A) and block-level
temporal attention (DR-mmst-B), respectively. The two attentions
do help improve the model’s accuracy, as presented in Table 3
where DR-mmst-A and DR-mmst-B get average 0.061 and 0.0632
increments over DR-mmst, respectively.
We show an example of the adaptive spatial attention (sa) and
the block-level temporal attention (tb) in Figure 4. To validate their
effectiveness, we also present the difference image and MMST map
between real and fake cases. From the view of spatial domain, the
difference image indicates the main changing caused by the fake is
around the nose, which is identical to the estimated adaptive spatial
attention. In terms of the temporal domain, the estimated temporal
attention has high values at the peaks of the difference MMST map.
Effectiveness of dual-spatial attention. In addition to the
adaptive spatial attention (DR-mmst-A), we further consider the
prior attention where the specified ROI blocks on faces are consid-
ered and realize the DR-mmst-AP. As validated in Table 3, DR-mmst-
AP outperforms DR-mmst-A on all compared datasets and obtains
average 0.033 improvement, which demonstrates the advantage of
dual-spatial attention over single adaptive spatial attention.
Effectiveness of dual-temporal attention. The block-level
temporal attentionmisses the details among frames. To alleviate this
issue, we add the frame-level temporal attention (F) to DR-mmst-B
with a Meso4 network for the frame-level DeepFake Detection and
get the DR-mmst-BF. As shown in Table 3, DR-mmst-BF has signif-
icantly higher accuracy than DR-mmst-B on all compared datasets.
The average improvement is 0.178, which shows the effectiveness
of our dual-temporal attention.
Effectiveness of dual-spatial-temporal attention and end-
to-end training.We put DR-mmst-AP and DR-mmst-BF together
and get DR-mmst-APBF. Compared with DR-mmst-AP, DR-mmst-
APBF has much higher accuracy on all datasets. However, when
comparing it with DR-mmst-BF, we observe that DR-mmst-APBF’s
accuracy slightly decreases on DFD, DF, and ALL datasets while
increasing on FS dataset. Though, when we train DR-mmst-APBF in
the end-to-endway and get DR-mmst-SPTM-e2e, it achieves highest
accuracy on all testing datasets, which indicates that training four
attention separately might not mine the potential power of the
four attention effectively, and training them together helps get
maximum effect.
4.4 Baseline Comparison on Robustness
In this section, we study the robustness of our method and two base-
line methods, i.e., Xception and MesoNet, which have the highest
accuracy among baselines. Their models are trained on the training
set of the ALL dataset.
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Figure 5: Frames andMMSTmaps of real and fake videos and their four degra-
dations, i.e., JPEG, blur, noise, and temporal sampling with their degradation
degrees being 60,11,15, and 10 that are medium values in the x-axis ranges
shown in Figure 7. Clearly, the JPEG, blur, and noise degradations do not af-
fect the MMSTmaps of raw videos, which indicates that our method has high
robustness to these degradations. The temporal sampling significantly dimin-
ishes the raw pattern of MMST maps. Hence, our method is sensitive to the
temporal sampling to some extent while our frame-level temporal attention
handling frames independently avoids the accuracy degeneration.
Table 3: Ablation study of our DeepRhythm (DR) by progressively adding
our MMSTR, adaptive spatial attention (A), prior spatial attention (P), block-
level temporal attention (B), frame-level temporal attention (F), and end-to-
end (e2e) training strategy.
train on ALL sub-dataset
test on DFD DF F2F FS ALL
DR-st 0.522 0.497 0.497 0.492 0.512
DR-mmst 0.814 0.684 0.635 0.64 0.84
DR-mmst-A 0.849 0.77 0.736 0.716 0.847
DR-mmst-B 0.872 0.745 0.731 0.731 0.85
DR-mmst-AP 0.879 0.816 0.766 0.756 0.867
DR-mmst-BF 0.97 0.969 0.954 0.959 0.966
DR-mmst-APBF 0.965 0.959 0.954 0.965 0.964
DR-mmst-APBF-e2e 0.972 0.98 0.964 0.959 0.98
We consider four general degradations, i.e., JPEG compression,
Gaussian blur, Gaussian noise, and temporal sampling, and con-
struct a degradation dataset by manipulating the testing set of the
ALL dataset. For the first three degradations, we add the corre-
sponding interference to each frame of the tested video and use
the compression quality, blur kernel size, and standard deviation of
noise to control the degradation degree, respectively. We show two
examples of these deegradations in Figure 5.
The temporal sampling means that we do not use the raw contin-
uous frames to generate the MMST map but select frame at every K
frames where K denotes the sampling interval. We use the tempo-
ral sampling to test if our method still works under the unsmooth
temporal variation. Please refer to the x-axis in Figure 6 and 7 for
the variation range of each degradation.
Robustness to JPEG compression. In Figure 6a, before com-
pression quality reaches 40, our method performs best among all
compared methods most of the time, only MesoNet has a little
higher accuracy when compression quality equals 80. According to
the average accuracy across all qualities, DeepRhythm gets 0.019
improvements over the second-best one, i.e., MesoNet. The robust-
ness to JPEG compression is derived from the ROI block-based
MMST representation where the missing details do little harm to
the discriminative power of MMSTR and let our method still work
under low frame quality. As shown in Figure 5, the MMST map of
JPEG compressed videos is almost the same to the raw video.
Robustness toGaussian blur. In Figure 6b, Xception, MesoNet,
and DeepRhythm decrease rapidly as blur kernel size increasing.
According to the average accuracy, our method is slightly worse
than Xception and MesoNet since the blur could affect the remote
heart rate signals and make the MMST map less discriminative.
Robustness to temporal sampling. In Figure 6c, Xception and
MesoNet show high robustness to the temporal sampling since they
perform DeepFake detection by handling frames independently and
do not consider the temporal variation properties of DeepFakes.
According to the average accuracy across different intervals, our
method, which considers temporal variation, is slightly worse than
Xception and MesoNet. The result is not surprised as our method
depends on the temporal features. Notably, although our method’s
accuracy decreases rapidly during sampling interval increasing
from 1 to 5, it vibrates around 0.89 after sampling interval equals
to 5. This is because our method does not only depend on the
temporal signals, e.g., the frame-level attention could still highlight
fake frames even in the absence of temporal features.
Robustness to Gaussian noise. In Figure 6d, as the noise be-
comes heavy, Xception,MesoNet, andDeepRhythmdecrease rapidly
at the beginning. After the standard deviation equals to 15, Deep-
Rhythm gets increasing, then to 20, Xception and MesoNet also
start increasing. While standard deviation increases from 10 to 25,
the accuracy of DeepRhythm is higher than Xception and MesoNet.
According to average accuracy across all noise levels, our method
does better than Xception and MesoNet.
In summary, our method has strong robustness on JPEG com-
pression and Gaussian noise, but do not perform well on temporal
sampling when compared with Xception and MesoNet. We could
mitigate the issue with the video frame interpolation techniques,
which is leaved as the future work.
4.5 Ablation Study on Robustness
We use the degradation dataset introduced in Sec. 4.4 to analyze the
robustness of MesoNet (i.e., the frame-level temporal attention) and
our seven DeepRhythm variants which are shown in the legend of
Figure 7. These methods can be roughly divided into two clusters,
one using MesoNet for the frame-level temporal attention (donated
as F-cluster), including MesoNet, DR-mmst-BF, DR-mmst-APBF,
and DR-mmst-APBF-e2e, the others do not employ the MesoNet
(donated as non-F-cluster), including DR-mmst, DR-mmst-A, DR-
mmst-B, and DR-mmst-AP.
Robustness to JPEG compression. In Figure 7a, the accuracy
of methods in F-cluster does not change too much before com-
pression quality becomes 50, then drops quickly. The methods of
non-F-cluster keep accuracy around 0.84 all the time, exhibiting
their excellent robustness.
Robustness to Gaussian blur. In Figure 7b, the methods of
F-cluster employ MesoNet for the frame-level temporal attention
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Figure 2: Baseline Comparison Felix: add stuff, need to be more informative
Table 4: JPEG Compression
Xception MesoNet DeepRhythm
0.67±0.283 0.852±0.133 0.871±0.145
Table 5: Blur
Xception MesoNet DeepRhythm
0.847±0.088 0.843±0.035 0.834±0.072
Table 6: Sampling
Xception MesoNet DeepRhythm
0.978±0.003 0.913±0.007 0.906±0.031
Table 7: Gaussian Noise
Xception MesoNet DeepRhythm
0.336±0.291 0.402±0.271 0.436±0.273
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Figure 3: Ablation Study Felix: add stuff, need to be more informative
Table 8: Gaussian Noise
DR-mmst DR-mmst-A DR-mmst-B DR-mmst-AP MesoNet DR-mmst-BF DR-mmst-APBF DR-mmst-APBF-e2e
JPEG Compression 0.838±0.007 0.836±0.006 0.841±0.006 0.855±0.006 0.852±0.133 0.853±0.146 0.868±0.133 0.871±0.145
Blur 0.843±0.003 0.838±0.004 0.845±0.003 0.856±0.004 0.843±0.035 0.84±0.067 0.832±0.068 0.834±0.072
Sampling 0.762±0.05 0.668±0.103 0.754±0.04 0.688±0.101 0.913±0.007 0.9±0.03 0.897±0.033 0.906±0.031
Gaussian Noise 0.842±0.002 0.834±0.011 0.84±0.006 0.855±0.006 0.402±0.271 0.425±0.274 0.444±0.265 0.436±0.273
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Figure 2: Baseline Comparison Felix: add stuff, need to be more informative
Table 4: JPEG Compression
Xception MesoNet DeepRhythm
0.67±0.283 0.852±0.133 0.871±0.145
Table 5: Blur
Xception MesoNet DeepRhythm
0.847±0.088 0.843±0.035 0.834±0.072
Table 6: Sampling
Xception MesoNet DeepRhythm
0.978±0.003 0.913±0.007 0.906±0.031
Table 7: Gaussian Noise
Xception MesoNet DeepRhythm
0.336±0.291 0.402±0.271 0.436±0.273
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Figure 3: Ablation Study Felix: add stuff, need to be more informative
Table 8: Gaussian Noise
DR-mmst DR-mmst-A DR-mmst-B DR-mmst-AP MesoNet DR-mmst-BF DR-mmst-APBF DR-mmst-APBF-e2e
JPEG Compression 0.838±0.007 0.836±0.006 0.841±0.006 0.855±0.006 0.852±0.133 0.853±0.146 0.868±0.133 0.871±0.145
Blur 0.843±0.003 0.838±0.004 0.845±0.003 0.856±0.004 0.843±0.035 0.84±0.067 0.832±0.068 0.834±0.072
Sampling 0.762±0.05 0.668±0.103 0.754±0.04 0.688±0.101 0.913±0.007 0.9±0.03 0.897±0.033 0.906±0.031
Gaussian Noise 0.842±0.002 0.834±0.011 0.84±0.006 0.855±0.006 0.402±0.271 0.425±0.274 0.444±0.265 0.436±0.273
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Figure 2: Baseline Comparison Felix: add stuff, need to be more informative
Table 4: JPEG Compression
Xception MesoNet DeepRhythm
0.67±0.2 3 0.852±0.133 0.871±0.145
Table 5: Blur
Xception MesoNet DeepRhythm
0.847±0.088 0.843±0.035 0.834±0.072
Table 6: Sampling
Xception MesoNet DeepRhythm
0.978±0.00 0.913±0.007 0.906±0.031
Table 7: Gaussian Noise
Xception MesoNet DeepRhythm
0.336±0.291 0.402±0.271 0.436±0.273
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Figure 3: Ablation Study Felix: add stuff, need to be more informative
Table 8: Gaussian Noise
DR-mmst DR-mmst-A DR- mst-B R- st- P MesoNet DR mmst-BF DR-mmst-APBF DR-mmst-APBF-e2e
JPEG Compression 0.838±0.007 0.836±0.006 0.841±0.006 0.855±0.006 0.852± .133 0.853±0.146 0.868±0.133 0.871±0.145
Blur 0.843±0.003 0.838± .004 0.845± .003 0.856±0.0 4 0.843± .0 5 0.84±0.067 0.832±0.068 0.834±0.072
Sampling 0.762± .05 0.668± .103 754±0.04 0.6 8±0.1 1 0.913± .0 7 0.9±0.03 0.897±0.033 0.906±0.031
Gaussian Noise 0.842±0.002 0.834±0.011 0.84±0.006 0.855±0.00 0.402± .271 0.425±0.274 0.444±0.265 0.436±0.273
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on a degradation dataset. Four degradations, i.e., JPEG compression, Gaussian blur, temporal sampling, and Gaussian noise, are added to the testing set of the ALL
dataset. The average accuracy and corresponding standard deviation across all degradation degrees are presented at the bottom of each sub-figure.
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(e) Average accuracy ± standard deviatio across degradation degrees
Figure 7: Ablation Study on robustness. We perform DeepFake detection through MesoNet and DeepRhythm’s seven variants on a degradation dataset. Four
degradations, i.e., JPEG compression, Gaussian blur, temporal sampling, and Gaussian noise, are added to the testing set of the ALL dataset. The comparedmethods
are clustered to two types, i.e., F-cluster usingMesoNet for frame-level temporal attention (i.e., MesoNet itself, DR-mmst-BF, DR-mmst-APBF, andDR-mmst-APBF-
e2e), and non-F-cluster that does not employ MesoNet (i.e., DR-mmst, DR-mmst-A, DR-mmst-B, and DR-mmst-AP). For each degradation, the average accuracy
and corresponding standard deviation across all degradation degrees are presented at the bottom of figure.
drop quickly as the blur becomes heavy. In contrast, the methods
of non-F-cluster stays around 0.85 across all blur levels.
Robustness to temporal sampling. In Figure 7c, F-cluster’s
methods although drop a little at the beginning, then they keep
accuracy around 0.9. In contrast, the methods of non-F-cluster drop
quickly and vibrate violently.
Robustness to Gaussian noise. In Figure 7d, non-F-cluster’s
methods remain constant around 0.85 while F-cluster’s methods
drop dramatically and maintain around 0.25.
Above observations demonstrates that our MMSTR helps the
variants, i.e., DR-mmst, DR-mmst-A, DR-mmst-B, and DR-mmst-
AP, keep almost the same accuracy across all compression quality.
The reason is that the MMSTR is calculated by average pooling
pixel values in ROI blocks, thus is insensitive to local pixel variation
caused by JPEG compression, Gaussian blur, and Gaussian noise.
As shown in Figure 5, the MMST maps of JPEG compressed, noisy,
and blurred videos are almost the same to the raw video.
On the other hand, the MesoNet handles frames independently
and relies on detail information within frames. As a result, it helps
our methods be robust to temporal sampling and achieve best per-
formance, but is sensitive to local pixel variation.
Clearly, the advantages and disadvantages ofMMSTR andMesoNet
are complementary. Our final version combining these two modules
shows comprehensive robustness across all degradations.
, ,
Hua Qi, Qing Guo, Felix Juefei-Xu, Xiaofei Xie, Lei Ma, Wei Feng, Yang Liu, and Jianjun Zhao
5 CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we have proposed a novel DeepFake detection tech-
nique that is intuitivelymotivated.Motivated by the fact that remote
visual photoplethysmography (PPG) is made possible bymonitoring
the minuscule periodic changes of skin color due to blood pumping
through the face, we conjecture that normal heartbeat rhythms
found in the real face videos will be diminished or even disrupted
entirely in a DeepFake video, making it a powerful indicator for
detecting DeepFakes. We have shown that our conjecture holds
true and the proposed method indeed can very effectively expose
DeepFakes by monitoring the heartbeat rhythms, which is termed
as DeepRhythm. DeepRhythm utilizes dual-spatial-temporal atten-
tion to adapt dynamic changing face and fake types. Extensive
experiments on FaceForensics++ and DFDC-preview datasets have
demonstrated not only the effectiveness of our proposed method,
but also how it can generalize over different datasets with various
DeepFakes generation techniques and challenging degradations. In
future work, one of the interesting directions worth pursuing is
to study the combined effort of our proposed DeepRhythm with
other DeepFake detectors [29, 30, 57, 59]. Beyond DeepFake detec-
tion, the investigation of how DeepRhythm can be applied further
to domains such as countering non-traditional adversarial attacks
[7, 22, 23, 60] is also potentially viable.
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